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COMMENTS 
SECURITIES ExcHANGE AcT oF 1934--CML REMEDIES BASED 
UPON ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF CREDIT IN VIOLATION OF REGULA· 
TION T-F9llowing the stock market crash of 1929, there was con-
siderable agitation for the regulation, and even the elimination, of 
the purchasing of securities on credit. Indeed, the extension of credit 
for the purchasing of securities became an issue in the 1932 presi-
dential campaign and finally, in 1934, came under direct federal 
control. Although the federal regulations were intended to elim-
inate the hazards associated with the extension of credit for the 
purchasing of securities, all the available evidence indicates that 
the substantial amount of credit in the stock market was a signif-
icant factor in pushing up prices during the bull market, and in 
magnifying the drop in prices that took place in May and June 
of 1962.1 The speculators seem to have had no difficulty in satisfying 
their demands for credit from a variety of lenders who were adept 
at circumventing both the federal and stock exchange regulations. 
To understand the problems involved in purchasing securities on 
credit, and in particular the civil remedies based upon the illegal 
extension of credit, it is essential to understand the various per-
tinent credit regulations. Indeed, the failure on the part of some 
courts to appreciate the complexities of these regulations has led 
to confusing statements in several opinions.2 
I. DESCRIPTION OF REGULATIONS 
The customer who purchases securities on credit is called a 
"margin trader," and the "margin" is the amount that he deposits, 
the balance being advanced by a "broker-dealer" or other lender. 
Sectipn 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 grants to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System4 the power to 
control margins by regulating the maximum amount of credit 
which can be extended for the purpose of purchasing securities. 
l See Rossant, Credit as a Catalyst, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1962, p. 27, col. 2; JVhat 
Made the Market Go JVild?, Bus. Week, June 9, 1962, p. 90. 
2 See, e.g., Goldenberg v. Bache & Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959) (court seems to 
treat an exchange violation as a federal violation); Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 
2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1961) (court seems to treat a federal 
violation as an exchange violation). 
3 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958). This statute is hereinafter 
referred to as the "act" or the "Exchange Act." 
4 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is hereinafter referred to 
as the "Board" or the "Federal Reserve Board." 
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Pursuant to the act, the Board has issued its Regulation T, 5 regu-
lating broker-dealers, and its Regulation U, 6 regulating banks, both 
of which control the extension of credit to margin traders. The 
Federal Reserve regulations establish minimum requirements only 
and do not prevent either stock exchanges or lenders from adopt-
ing additional and higher margin requirements.7 
There are two distinct types of margin requirements, one ap-
plying only at the time of purchase and the other applying at all 
subsequent times. An initial margin is required to be deposited 
in connection with the purchase of a security on credit. The initial 
deposit reflects the margin trader's equity in the security on the 
date of purchase, the equity being equivalent to the market value 
of the security reduced by the amount of credit outstanding on 
the security. On the other hand, if the market value of the security 
subsequently declines, the margin trader may be required to de-
posit additional margin to maintain his equity in the security at 
a specified "maintenance" level, which is generally lower than the 
level required for his initial equity. For example, if, under the 
initial margin requirement he must deposit fifty percent in con-
nection with the purchase of a security valued at 100 dollars, his 
initial equity would be fifty dollars. Should the value of the secur-
ity decline to sixty dollars, his equity in the security will decline 
to ten dollars, and, assuming that the "maintenance" requirement 
is twenty-five percent of the current market value, he must deposit 
an additional five dollars. 
A. Federal Regulations 
Since a discussion of Regulation U is beyond the scope of this 
comment, the following description is limited to Regulation T, 
which "applies to every member of a national securities exchange 
and every broker or dealer who transacts a business in securities 
through the medium of any such member.''8 Only securities listed 
on a national exchange are subject to its provisions;0 however, 
certain listed securities, notably securities of the federal govern-
ment and state and local bonds, are exempted.10 Under Regula-
i; 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1959). 
6 Id. § 221. 
7 Id. §§ 220.7(e), 221.3(i). 
8 Id. § 220.I. 
O Id. § 220.3(c)(2). "Listed securities," referred to in Regulation T as "registered se-
curities," include securities having unlisted trading privileges on a national securities 
exchange and securities exempted by the SEC. Id. § 220.2(d). 
lu Id. § 220.3(c)(2). The term "e.xempted" securities is used with the same meaning 
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tion T unlisted securities have no collateral value and must be 
purchased strictly on a cash basis.11 Finally, the extension of credit, 
with securities as collateral, for purposes other than purchasing or 
carrying securities is not subject to the Regulation.12 
Although the Exchange Act grants to the Board power to 
prescribe both an initial and a maintenance requirement,13 Reg-
ulation T sets only an initial margin requirement. The Board 
establishes the initial margin requirement by promulgating, from 
time to time, the "maximum loan value" for listed securities in 
terms of a percentage of their current market value.14 For example, 
if the "maximum loan value" is set at thirty percent, the margin 
trader must deposit seventy dollars in connection with the pur-
chase of a security valued at I 00 dollars. Since all securities pur-
chased on credit are included in the margin trader's general margin 
account,15 the amount of margin which must be deposited in con-
nection with a purchase of additional securities is reduced to the 
extent of the "available credit" in the account.16 The "available 
credit" is the total of the current maximum loan values of all 
securities held in the particular account reduced by the credit out-
standing in the account.17 In other words, although the maximum 
loan value of a security is initially determined at the time it is 
purchased, the maximum loan value of the securities held in the 
account is continually recalculated on the basis of present margin 
requirements and current market values18 to determine the ac-
count's "available credit." 
Although the Board prescribes the "maximum loan value" 
from time to time, credit initially extended on a purchase may be 
retained regardless of a reduction of the margin trader's equity 
due to declines in market price, termination of the listed or exempt 
as that given to it in § 3(a)(l2) of the Exchange Act [48 Stat. 884 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(l2) (1958)]. 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(e) (1959). 
11 Id. § 220.3(c)(2). 
12 Id. § 220.4(f)(8). 
13 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958). 
14 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(2) (1959). The "maximum loan value" is prescribed in id. 
§ 220.8 (Supp. 1962). The "current market value" of a security is its total cost or the 
net proceeds of its sale. Id. § 220.3(c)(4). 
15 Id. § 220.3(a). For "special accounts," see id. § 220.4. 
16 Id. § 220.3(b)(l). 
17 Ibid. The credit outstanding, referred to in Regulation T as "adjusted debit bal-
ance," includes the current market value of the securities sold "short" in the account 
and other specified items that could make it differ from the net debit balance of the 
account. Id. § 220.3(c)(4). 
18 The "current market value" of securities held in the account is the closing sales 
price of the security on the preceding business day. Id. § 220.3(c)(4). 
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status of securities in the account, or changes in initial margin 
requirements.19 However, when more credit is outstanding on the 
securities in the account than would be permitted in the event of 
a new purchase of the same securities under current margin re-
quirements, the account becomes "restricted," and Regulation T 
places limitations upon the withdrawal and substitution of secur-
ities in a "restricted" general account.20 Listed or exempted secur-
ities can be withdra-wn from a "restricted" account only if other 
listed or exempted securities (counted at their maximum loan 
value),21 or cash, are deposited in the account in an amount equal 
to the specified retention requirement, which is a percentage of 
the current market values of the securities withdrawn.22 However, 
the margin trader may sell one security and buy another of no 
greater value on the same day since the status of an account is 
determined only at the close of each day.23 If there is "available 
credit" in the account, obviously there is no restriction on with-
drawals. 
Certain transactions are excluded from the requirements of 
the general margin account, for example, the exercise of subscrip-
tion rights. To avoid hampering the acquisition of additional 
capital by industry and to facilitate the maintenance by existing 
shareholders of their proportionate ownership of a corporation, 
the Board prescribes a lower margin requirement for securities 
acquired through the exercise of subscription rights.24 However, 
the special subscriptions account cannot be used as a means of 
avoiding the margin requirements of a general account.25 
19 Id. § 220.7(b). 
20 Id. § 220.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1962). "Restriction" may result, for example, from a de-
cline in the market value of the securities in the account or an increase in margin 
requirements. 
21 The maximum loan value of an exempted security is determined by the broker-
dealer in good faith. Id. § 220.3(c)(2). 
22 Id. § 220.3(b)(2) (Supp. 1962). The retention requirement is prescribed in id. 
§ 220.B(c) (Supp. 1962). 
23 Id. § 220.4(h)(l). 
24 Ibid. The margin is set at 25% of the current market value of the securities 
acquired in cash. 
25 Id. § 220.4(a)(3). "An example of a transaction for which the special subscriptions 
account is not intended would be as follows: 
"A customer having a 'long' position of 100 shares of security 'A' in a 'restricted' 
general account receives rights to subscribe to additional shares of security 'A.' Using 
his rights, and possibly purchasing additional rights if necessary, he makes a subscrip-
tion to 100 shares of security 'A' in the special subscriptions account on 25% margin. 
He then sells the 100 shares of security • A' in his general account and withdraws 75% 
of the net proceeds of sale. 
"This customer did not use his rights as a stockholder to retain his equity in the 
corporation. He merely used the rights as a device to carry the security position on 
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B. Exchange Requirements 
Illustrative of the exchange margin requirements is New York 
Stock Exchange Rule 431, which provides both initial margin and 
maintenance requirements.26 The required initial margin is an 
amount equivalent to the maintenance requirement, with a mini-
mum equity of 1,000 dollars. The maintenance requirement, which 
is particularly significant because of the omission of a like require-
ment under Regulation T, depends upon the type of transaction. 
For example, the aggregate of all securities "long"27 in the ac-
count must be constantly maintained at a twenty-five percent mar-
gin level.28 This required margin expresses the relationship of the 
margin trader's equity in the securities to their current market 
value.29 Although listed securities exempted under Regulation T 
are subject to Rule 431, they receive favorable treatment.30 
C. Private Requirements 
If the broker-dealer or other lender feels inadequately pro-
tected by the federal or exchange requirements, he may demand 
and obtain higher initial margin and maintenance requirements 
through separate agreements with individual traders. In any event, 
all margin accounts are watched daily at brokerage houses, par-
ticularly those in which the need for more margin is becoming 
apparent. When, in the broker's opinion, the margin gets too low, 
which may be as much as forty percent of the current market value 
of the security, he sends out a margin call for more cash or collat-
eral. Normally a customer will be allowed three full business days 
to meet the margin call, although the period may be as short as 
one day. 
IL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
To determine the principal purpose underlying the federal 
credit regulations, attention should be focused on the legislative 
history of these provisions. As a resulf of the economic events fol-
25% margin instead of 75% margin by transferring it to the special subscriptions ac-
count." New York Stock Exchange M.F. Circular No. 79, at 2, July 12, 1951. 
26 Rules 43l(a), (b). 
27 A "long" position signifies ownership of securities, whereas a "short" position sig-
nifies securities sold short and not covered as of a particular date. 
28 Rule 43l(b)(l). A customer may consolidate all transactions to support his posi• 
tion. 
29 See Rule 43l(d)(l) for determination of value for margin purposes. 
30 Rule 43l(c)(2). 
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lowing the stock market crash of 1929 some persons advocated the 
complete prohibition of purchasing securities on credit, while 
others adopted the thesis that, even though some margin should be 
required, a liquid market-made liquid with borrowed funds-
is desirable.31 Although the latter view prevailed, the voluminous 
hearings on the proposed legislation brought out a wide range of 
opinions concerning the purposes which margin regulations should 
serve. 
Three primary objectives were advanced during the legislative 
hearings as being the basic purposes for the enactment of legisla-
tion governing margin requirements. First, it was advocated that 
the principal objective should be the protection of the margin 
trader, sometimes referred to as the "innocent Iamb," in contra-
distinction to the protection of the broker-dealer afforded by the 
exchange and private margin requirements.32 The Senate report 
asserted that the main objective of the margin regulations was to 
protect the margin trader by making it impossible for him to buy 
on too thin a margin,33 since in the event of unfavorable develop-
ments in the financial world such loans are promptly called and 
may result in the forced sale of the margin trader's securities.34 
Indeed, margin traders are frequently sold out near the bottom 
of a market decline, thereby maximizing their losses. Secondly, 
the opinion was expressed that margin regulations should be in-
struments of credit policy designed to stabilize stock market fluc-
tuations and thus contribute to business stability. 35 In theory, 
when security prices rise the margin trader has more available 
credit to buy more securities on margin, and, in addition, more 
investors may be induced to buy on margin. Such purchases, in 
turn, tend to raise prices further and so increase again the ability 
of the margin trader to borrow, whereas a decline in security prices 
frequently results in forced selling to meet margin calls which, in 
turn, increases the volume of sell orders and intensifies the decline 
in prices.36 Finally, the House committee took the position that 
31 See generally BOGEN &: KRooss, SECURITY CREDIT ch. 8 (1960), for a general discus-
sion of the background of the regulations. 
32 On protection of Exchange members, see id. at 80. 
33 Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Report on Stock Exchange Practices, 
S. REP. No. 1955, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). 
34 "[N]o evidence has ever been gathered on the volume of 'distress selling' and the 
number of persons forced out by the slim margins and great depreciations in price of 
the early 1930's." VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS 55 (1941). 
3G Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 15 (1934). 
36 BOGEN &: KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, at 42-43. 
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the margin regulations were to be designed as selective credit 
controls to regulate the aggregate amount of credit which could 
be directed into the stock market and out of the more productive 
uses of commerce and industry.37 There was a desire to prevent a 
recurrence of the pre-crash situation where capital which would 
have otherwise been available to supply the needs of commerce, 
industry and agriculture was attracted by the high interest rates 
in the stock market. 38 
The Exchange Act clearly states that credit regulations are 
designed primarily to regulate the use of credit; section 7 granted 
the Board authority to regulate the extension of credit "for the 
purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purpose 
of purchasing and carrying securities."39 Moreover, Congress ap-
parently intended that the Board's power would be used to prevent 
undue market fluctuations and to help stabilize the economy in 
general, because it directed the Board to adopt, as its initial method 
of regulation, a formula based upon past price movements of each 
security used as collateral.40 In addition, both of these objectives 
are expressions of national credit policy, and after extended debate 
the administration of the margin provisions was assigned to the 
Federal Reserve Board, an agency designed to stabilize the nation's 
economic progress, rather than to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. It is also of interest to note that the original bill was 
rewritten along the lines suggested by the Federal Reserve Board 
and the Treasury Department.41 In practice, the Board itself has 
followed the philosophy that the regulations were intended to be 
instruments of monetary policy. The Board chairman has stated: 
"Regulation of stock market credit is a supplemental in-
strument of credit policy . . . , one of the means of making 
a broad credit and monetary policy effective. . . . [E]ach in-
strument of credit policy ... should be used in such a manner 
as to blend all the instruments into a harmonious whole for 
the maximum contribution to stabilize economic progress for 
the whole community."42 
37 House Report on Stock Exchange Practices, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1934). 
38 For other proposed objectives, see BOGEN & KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, ch. 8. 
39 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1958). See also § 2(3)(a), 48 
Stat. 882 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3)(a) (1958). 
40 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1958). 
41 BOGEN & KRooss, op. cit. supra note 31, at 94. 
42 1 Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Monetary Policy and the Management 
of the Public Debt, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 409-10 (1952). 
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This policy is reflected in the Board's justifications for the seven-
teen basic changes in margin requirements which it has ordered 
from 1934 through 1962,43 and in the Board's establishment of a 
lower margin requirement for the exercise of subscription rights. 
Thus, regulation of the use of credit and stabilization of the stock 
market would seem to constitute the primary objectives underlying 
the federal credit regulations, with the protection of the "innocent 
lamb" as only a possible by-product. 
III. JUSTIFICATION OF CML REMEDIES BASED UPON 
THE ILLEGAL EXTENSION OF CREDIT 
The Exchange Act contains no express civil remedy for the 
illegal extension of credit.44 The act does, however, contain three 
specific civil liability sections: 9(e), for manipulation;45 16(b), for 
insiders' profits from short-swing trading;46 and 18, for misleading 
statements in documents filed with the SEC.47 Also, courts have 
afforded implied civil remedies under certain provisions of the 
act; for example, private litigants have frequently recovered dam-
ages for violations of section IO(b),48 an anti-fraud provision, and 
the Commission's Rule IOb-5 issued thereunder.49 For the most 
part, the civil remedies, both express and implied, have been based 
upon provisions designed to protect the investor from certain un-
fair practices such as misrepresentation and inadequate disclo-
sure. 50 Most of the implied remedies can be justified on the ground 
that they effectuate the underlying policy of the provisions, and 
that, in addition, they are statutory alternatives for the common-
law action for deceit. However, substantially different considera-
tions are involved with regard to implied civil remedies under the 
credit regulations. Not only were the regulations designed pri-
marily as instruments of national fiscal policy, rather than to 
provide protection to the investor, but also no public policy 
against the extension of credit for the purchase of securities existed 
at common law. 
43 See BoGEN 8: KROoss, op. cit. supra note 31, app. III, at 169-77 (listing the stated 
reasons for changes in margin requirements). 
44 See 48 Stat. 886 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1958). 
41i 48 Stat. 890 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1958). 
46 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958). 
47 48 Stat. 897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1958). 
48 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1958). 
49 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949). 
liO See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 
870 (1961); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); 
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
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As the Senate report indicates, there was some opinion to the 
effect that the principal objective of the credit regulations should 
be the protection of the margin trader from the risk of trading on 
too thin a margin. Indeed, this may be an intended by-product 
of the regulations; but this hardly seems to be a sufficient justifica-
tion for implying civil remedies for the illegal extension of credit. 
Furthermore, most of the credit cases suggest that all margin trad-
ers are to be protected.51 However, not all margin traders are "in-
nocent lambs"; in fact, many are sophisticated investors and have 
the facilities and sources of information needed for determining 
the suitability of purchasing securities on credit. The margin 
trader, not the broker-dealer, is a speculator, and he knowingly 
assumes the risk of purchasing securities on an inadequate margin. 
It seems doubtful that Congress intended that all margin traders 
be treated as a special class of persons requiring protection from 
their own lack of judgment.52 Moreover, even the inexperienced 
trader is allowed complete discretion within the limits of the 
margin requirements as to the amount of credit he can obtain; 
whereas, in certain transactions not covered by Regulation T, the 
broker-dealer is required to determine the suitability of the loan 
arrangement in accordance with the individual's financial situa-
tion.53 
On the other hand, implied remedies based- on violations of 
the credit regulations may be justified to the extent that they con-
tribute to the enforcement of those regulations. Although the 
power to establish the regulations was assigned to the Federal 
Reserve Board, enforcement was delegated to the SEC. In turn, 
the SEC has allowed the stock exchanges to be more or less self-
regulating in this regard. In light of the recent exposure of the 
apparent inadequacy of self-regulation,54 and the lack of manpower 
in the SEC to police the individual broker-dealers adequately, 
additional instruments of enforcement are apparently necessary. 
Suits to enforce an implied civil liability may provide one such 
51 See, e.g., Reader v. Hirsch &: Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Remar v. Clayton 
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949). 
52 For an interesting example of special treatment to a particular class, cf. Glover 
v. Callahan, 299 Mass. 55, 12 N.E.2d 194 (1937); Bishop v. Liston, 112 Neb. 559, 199 N.W. 
825 (1924) (both involving suits for damages for rape in which minors were treated as 
a special class requiring protection). 
53 See SEC Rule § 240.15c2-5, 27 Fed. Reg. 7091 (1962). 
54 SEC, REPORT ON ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CONDUcr OF 
MEMBERS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962). See also SEC Plans Increased Securi-
ties Industry Control; Stricter Self-Regulation Urged, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1962, p. 2 
(warning by William L. Cary, SEC Chairman). 
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instrument. The risk of private litigation might deter a potential 
violator, and, in addition, private actions would expose past viola-
tions that might otherwise go undiscovered. However, because of 
the expense involved, it seems likely that only violations result-
ing in substantial losses to the margin trader will be the subject 
of litigation, and these violations would probably be reported to 
the Commission regardless of whether a private remedy existed. 
Moreover, the broker-dealers' great fear is of publicity of alleged 
violations, and this results as much from complaints registered 
with the SEC or exchanges as from private litigation. Their 
primary concern is the loss of good will and the accompanying 
loss of business, rather than potential civil liability. Thus, whether 
the implied civil remedies actually aid the enforcement of the 
regulations appears to be dubious. 
IV. CIVIL REMEDIES 
Federal courts55 have thus far not been hesitant in implying 
civil remedies for violations of the federal credit regulations. In 
the typical case, the broker-dealer illegally extends credit, and 
when the price of the security declines, the margin trader is sold 
out. Liability to the margin trader is based upon a general 
tort theory or, alternatively, on the ground that the contract is • 
void.56 Although both are traditional rationales for implied lia-
bilities under the Exchange Act, 57 neither the tort nor the void 
contract theory is easily adapted to cases involving the illegal ex-
tension of credit. Moreover, since the credit violation cases have all 
been decided on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 
the decisions fail to resolve many problems peculiar to a cause of 
action founded upon an illegal extension of credit. 
The void contract theory is based upon section 29(b) of the 
Exchange Act, which provides in part: 
"Every contract made in violation of any provision of this 
title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, and every con-
tract . . . heretofore or hereafter made the performance of 
which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any 
rm The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in suits to enforce a liability or 
duty created by the Exchange Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 48 Stat. 902, 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958). 
GO See, e.g., Goldenberg v. Bache 8: Co., 270 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1959); Warshaw v. 
Hentz &: Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
u7 For an excellent discussion of the alternative theories underlying the implied lia-
bilities, see 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1757-63 (1961). 
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relationship or practice in violation of any provision of this 
title or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be void . . . as 
regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such 
provision, rule or regulation shall have made or engaged in 
the performance of any such contract. . . . " 58 
Although this statutory provision does not specifically provide for 
a civil remedy, one court, in implying a remedy, has observed: 
"[A] statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall 
be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The 
statute would be of little value unless a party to the contract 
could apply to the Courts to relieve himself of obligations under 
it .... " 59 Relying on the 1938 amendment to section 29(b), which 
deals in part with actions maintained in reliance upon the sub-
section, 60 another court inferred that Congress, in passing the 
amendment, manifested the intention that the original statute be 
interpreted as providing for civil suits.61 Furthermore, this court 
indicated, in dictum, that the plaintiff not only had an action for 
rescission but also one for damages. The inclusion of a damage 
remedy is dubious since the Senate report, in referring to the 
amendment, expressed an intent favoring private litigation only 
for rescission. 62 
However, since section 29(b) voids only the rights of a party to 
an illegal contract, it is not particularly suited to contracts in-
volving the illegal extension of credit because of the three-fold 
relationship between the broker-dealer and the margin trader. 
In any particular transaction involving securities, a broker-dealer 
acts either as the agent (broker) for the margin trader in purchas-
ing from a third person, or as a principal (dealer), being the actual 
vendor of the security; in advancing money for the purchase, the 
broker-dealer becomes the margin trader's creditor; and, finally, 
in holding the security to secure payment of his advances, the 
broker-dealer becomes the pledgee of the security.63 Since the 
broker, in contradistinction to the dealer, is not a party to a valid 
purchase contract, should a margin trader be able to recover his 
58 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958). 
59 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Cf. Gold-
stein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). 
60 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1958). 
61 Geismar v. Bond &: Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
62 S. REP. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 10 (1938). 
63 Eddy v. Schiebel, 112 Conn. 248, 152 Atl. 66 (1930). For the technical aspects of 
the relationship, see generally BLACK, THE LAw OF STOCK EXCHANGES, STOCK BROKERS AND 
CusroMERS (1940); MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1931). 
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margin in an action for rescission against the broker, since the 
margin only passed through the broker as a conduit to the inno-
cent seller? Admittedly, a court may extend the illegality of the 
loan arrangement to the purchase transaction, since the loan is 
illegal under the regulations only to the extent that credit is ex-
tended for the purchase of securities. 64 The broker may be treated 
as the vendor of the securities rather than as an agent who served 
simply as a conduit between the margin trader and the innocent 
vendor, and thus the margin trader may be allowed to rescind the 
purchase agreement and recover his margin from the broker. 
Although this requires strained reasoning, such a result may be 
justified because most margin traders actually regard the broker, 
rather than the unknown third party, as the vendor. But if the 
credit is extended subsequent to the purchase, the connection 
between the illegality of the loan arrangement and the purchase 
transaction may be substantially weakened. 65 On the other hand, 
since the rights of the broker-dealer are void on the loan arrange-
ment, should the margin trader be able to receive a windfall by 
retaining title to the stock66 and ignoring the illegal loan? Surely 
with a little effort a court would be able to prevent a forfeiture 
of the broker-dealer's interest which might otherwise result from 
the margin trader's election to retain the securities and ignore 
the void loan contract. For instance, one court equated the voiding 
language of section 29(b) with a total breach of contract and al-
lowed the seller, who had violated section 16 of the Exchange Act, 
to recover the market value of the securities delivered.61 
Assuming that a court overcomes the aforementioned obstacles, 
it still must determine whether the rights of the margin trader 
are subject to the voiding provisions. One court has held that a 
margin trader, allegedly entering into a contract in good faith and 
without knowledge of Regulation T, is subject to section 29(b), 
and that the good faith defense of the Exchange Act68 does not 
apply to parties to the contract. 69 The decision is justifiable if a 
literal construction is given to the language of section 29(b)(l), 
64 See 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1518 (rev. ed. 1962), and cases cited therein. 
65 See id. § 1529, and cases cited therein. 
66 Title to stock is in the margin trader although the stock is immediately pledged to 
the broker and held in "street name." Hobart v. Vanden Bosch, 256 Mich. 686, 240 
N.W. 1 (19.32). 
61 Banker's Life 8: Cas. Co. v. Ballanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
.368 U.S. 827 (1961). 
68 Willful violation is a condition of criminal liability. Securities Exchange Act 
of 19.34, § .32, 48 Stat. 904, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78ff(a) (1958). 
60 Cohen v. G. F. Rothchild 8: Co., Civil No. 108-397, S.D.N.Y., March 31, 1958. 
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which provides, in part, that "every contract shall be void ... as 
regards the rights of any person who, in violation of such provi-
sion . . . shall have made any such contract or engaged in the 
performance of any such contract."7° Congress could have expressly 
voided only the rights of a violator rather than ambiguously void-
ing the rights of "any person" who makes a contract in vio-
lation of the act. Even assuming that section 29(b) voids only 
the rights of a violator, a court may be justified in regarding a 
margin trader, who is aware of the regulations, as a violator, be-
cause he aided and abetted the broker-dealer in his violation.71 
On the other hand, one court stated, in dictum, that the remedy 
is not affected by the margin trader's participation in the violation 
since Congress regards him as incapable of protecting himself.72 
However, the credit regulations were not designed to insure the 
margin trader who knowingly assumes the risk of too thin a margin 
against a loss from his own speculation, but rather were designed 
as instruments of credit policy. In a related area, New York courts 
have twice denied relief to a margin trader whose claim was based 
upon violations of exchange margin requirements, since a margin 
trader presumably has the facilities to determine the suitability 
of a loan arrangement.73 There may, however, be some justifica-
tion for protecting a margin trader who is inexperienced in pur-
chasing securities on credit. Since the margin regulations are in-
deed complex, it does not seem unreasonable for an inexperienced 
trader to rely upon the superior knowledge of the broker-dealer, 
who holds himself out as an expert in the securities business.74 
Perhaps the law should protect the inexperienced trader from his 
own incapability. In fact, courts will probably continue to protect 
at least the inexperienced trader, assuming that the prior decisions 
which have merely denied motions to dismiss are actually indica-
tive of the current judicial attitude toward questions of substance. 
As an alternative ground for affording a civil remedy for vio-
10 48 Stat. 903 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(c) (1958). 
71 The United States Criminal Code provides that whoever aids and abets in the 
commission of an offense is a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). Where a broker arranged 
for an illegal extension of credit by a private money lender, the latter was held to 
have aided and abetted the broker, and was thus subject to § 29(b)'s voiding provisions. 
Bonner v. Goldman, Civil No. 61-374-c, D. Mass., March 21, 1962. 
72 Remar v. Cla)'ton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949). 
73 Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 
1953), afj'd, 284 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1954) (violation of a cotton exchange 
margin requirement); Weis & Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d 628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. 
City Munic. Ct. 1961) (violation of New York Stock Exchange margin requirement). 
74 Cf. Cardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (1950) (expert participating in 
an illegal transaction). 
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lation of credit regulations courts have turned to the law of torts, 
in particular to the theory that if defendant's violation of a pro-
hibitive statute75 results in a particular danger causing injury to 
the plaintiff, the latter has a right of action if one of the purposes 
of the enactment was to protect individual interests such as the 
plaintiff's from that danger.76 Even assuming that the credit regu-
lations were designed to protect the inexperienced trader, there 
are additional obstacles to applying this tort doctrine to credit 
extension cases. Possibly the greatest of these obstacles is finding 
the causal connection between the inadequate margin and the in-
jury. Initially, the margin trader should be required to demon-
strate that the inadequacy of the initial margin was a substantial 
factor in causing the injury.77 If he could have met the additional 
margin call, then the initial inadequacy was not a significant cause. 
Even if the margin trader was unable to meet the call, he should 
be required to demonstrate that the extension of excessive credit 
was the inducement for making the purchase.78 Assuming the in-
ducement, the broker-dealer should be allowed to demonstrate that 
an intervening event caused the injury. For example, the broker-
dealer may have lawfully repledged the securities with a third 
party who became insolvent79 or who converted the securities.80 
A court may even have difficulty in finding causation when the 
loss results from the failure of the issuer of the securities,81 as 
compared with a loss caused by a general decline in securities 
prices. For the most part judicial decisions have expressly left open 
the question of causal connection.82 
Perhaps the tort remedy should be available to an inexperienced 
trader in certain cases, but not to a sophisticated trader who know-
ingly assumes the risk of an inadequate margin. Although the 
amount of recovery allowed in a tort action would probably be 
limited to out-of-pocket loss, and thus would be identical to the 
75 The tort theory does not apply to violations of exchange margin requirements. 
Nichols &: Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1953), 
aff'd, 284 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1954); Weis &: Co. v. Offenberger, 31 Misc. 2d 
628, 220 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1961). 
76 2 llEsTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). See also Reader v. Hirsch &: Co., 197 F. Supp. 
Ill, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing § 286); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 
1017 (D. Mass. 1949) (leading case). 
77 See PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 218-19 (2d ed. 1955). 
78 Smith v. Bear, 237 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1956) (dictum). 
70 See, e.g., Warshow v. Hentz &: Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
80 See, e.g., Appel v. Levine, 85 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
81 See, e.g., Nichols & Co. v. Columbus Credit Corp., 204 Misc. 848, 126 N.Y.S.2d 715 
(Sup. Ct. 1953), a[f'd, 248 App. Div. 870, 134 N.Y .S.2d 591 (1954). 
82 See, e.g., Warshow v. Hentz & Co., 199 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
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amount of recovery allowed under the void contract theory, the 
former basis for liability may afford additional coverage. If the 
broker-dealer is acting only in the capacity of creditor-pledgee, 
not having participated in the purchase, the margin trader could 
still rely upon the tort doctrine, even though the margin did not 
pass through the broker-dealer.83 Moreover, the broker-dealer may 
have arranged for a third party to extend the credit and there-
fore may be acting solely in the capacity of an agent. Although 
the availability of a claim against the broker-dealer on the void 
contract theory seems dubious, the trader might rely upon the 
tort doctrine since the broker-dealer has violated Regulation T 
by arranging for an extension of credit in violation of the margin 
requirements. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It seems likely that courts will continue to imply civil remedies 
for violations of credit regulations, at least for the protection of 
inexperienced margin traders. However, recovery should be de-
nied to the sophisticated trader on the ground that he is an ac-
complice in the violation. Denying him a remedy would serve 
as a greater deterrent to future violations of Regulation T than 
an allowance of relief. Surely the sophisticated trader would be hesi-
tant to enter into an unenforceable contract and be branded as 
a violator of a federal statute. Of course, a standard for deciding 
who is an inexperienced trader must be determined, but, more 
importantly, the courts must clarify the rights of the margin trader 
generally if section 29(b) is to act as a significant deterrent to the 
illegal extension of credit to the sophisticated trader. 
Clarification of the implied civil remedies under the credit 
r~gulations may provide a possible solution to the problem of 
unregulated sources of credit for the purchase of securities. The 
Federal Reserve Board has authority84 to prescribe rules and reg-
ulations governing the extension of credit to purchase securities 
by persons other than exchange members and broker-dealers trans-
acting a business in securities through such members.85 Pursuant 
to that authority the Board has thus far issued Regulation U, which 
is applicable only to banks.86 Credit provided by unregulated 
83 Assuming the implied remedy based upon § 29(b) does not include an action for 
damages. 
84 48 Stat. 887 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1958). 
85 If a broker-dealer transacts a business in securities through the medium of a 
member, he is subject to the regulations even as to a particular transaction which is 
not effected through a member. Federal Reserve Bull., Nov. 1938, p. 951. 
86 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1959). 
lenders such as factors and foreign banks is not presently affected
by margin regulations.8 7 There is evidence that these unregulated
sources of credit have been employed frequently to circumvent
credit regulations, especially at times when high margin require-
ments were in effect."' The Board recognized the importance of
unregulated lending when it amended Regulation U in 1959 to
provide that reports may be required not only from banks, but
also from any person engaged substantially in the business of mak-
ing loans for the purpose of purchasing and carrying listed securi-
ties.89 Lack of adequate enforcement facilities presents the major
obstacle to the effective application of margin requirements to
unregulated lenders. Some hope has been expressed that this ob-
stacle can be overcome through the judicial development of im-
plied remedies.90 Regrettably, there is no way to assess accurately
the deterrent effect on the illegal extension of credit resulting
from the existence of implied civil remedies.
Robert G. Lane, S.Ed.
87 But cf. Bronner v. Goldman, Civil No. 61-374-c, D. Mass., March 21, 1962 (private
money lenders held to have aided and abetted a broker-dealer in violating Regulation T).
Section 8(a) does make it unlawful for broker-dealers to borrow on listed securities except
from member banks, non-member banks who have agreed to abide by the Board's re-
quirements, or other broker-dealers who are subject to the Board's rules. 48 Stat. 888
(1934), as aijended, 15 U.S.C. § 78h(a) (1958). Regulation U subjects to the margin
requirements any loan by a bank to a person engaged substantially in the business of
making loans for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered securities. 12 C.F.R.
I 221.3q (Supp. 1962).
88 See Rossant, Credit as a Catalyst, N.Y. Times, July 80, 1962, p. 27, col. 2; What
Made the Market Go Wild?, Bus. Week, June 9, 1962, p. 90.
89 12 C.F.R. § 221.3j (Supp. 1962).
90 See Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (discussing jurisdiction over
foreign lenders).
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